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A REBUTTAL TO KINSLER’S AND TO 
ANDERSON AND MULLER’S STUDIES ON 
THE PURPORTED RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN BAR PASSAGE RATES AND 
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE 
WILLIAM WESLEY PATTON† 
INTRODUCTION 
Because of the escalating cost of legal education and the 
recent decline in bar passage rates among ABA approved law 
schools, some analysts have reasonably attempted to determine 
the social costs of legal education.1  Many have attempted to 
place the blame on segments of the legal education marketplace.2  
 
† U.S.C. Gould School of Law, Lecturer; Assistant Clinical Vol Professor, UCLA 
David Geffen School of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry. I thank Professors 
David Welkowitz and Michael Simkevic for their comments and suggestions. 
1 Alexei Koseff, A Bar Too High? Pass Rate Plummets to Record Low for 
California Lawyer Exam, SACRAMENTO BEE (May 19, 2018), 
https://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/article211500444.html; Mark Hansen, 
What Do Falling Bar-Passage Rates Mean for Legal Education--and the Future of the 
Profession?, ABA J. (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/ 
article/legal_education_bar_exam_passage; Andrew Brockman, Cost of Legal 
Education, MICH. ST. INT’L. L. REV.: OFFICIAL LEGAL F. PAGE (May 11, 2017), 
https://www.msuilr.org/msuilr-legalforum-blogs/2017/5/11/cost-of-legal-education; 
Debra Cassens Weiss, Legal Education Cost Is Even Higher than First Estimated, 
Transparency Group Says, ABA J. (May 7, 2012), http://www.abajournal.com/ 
news/article/legal_education_cost_is_even_higher_than_first_estimated_transparenc
y_group. 
2  See, e.g., Staci Zaretsky, Failed Law School Somehow Musters up 
“Respectable” Bar Exam Pass Rate Before Closure, ABOVE THE LAW (Nov. 30, 2018), 
https://abovethelaw.com/2018/11/failed-law-school-somehow-musters-up-respectable-
bar-exam-pass-rate-before-closure/; Jill Switzer, Bar Exam Pass Rates Suck, so Does 
Legal Education Need a Reboot?, ABOVE THE LAW (Nov. 28, 2018), 
https://abovethelaw.com/ 2018/11/bar-exam-pass-rates-suck-so-does-legal-education-
need-a-reboot/; Staci Zaretsky, Law School Once Again Destroys State’s Bar Exam 
Passage Rate, ABOVE THE LAW (May 16, 2017), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/05/law-
school-once-again-destroys-states-bar-exam-passage-rate/; Paul L. Caron, Eighteen 
Law Schools Would Fail ABA’s Proposed 75% Bar Passage Within 2 Years 
Accreditation Standard, TAXPROF BLOG (Jan. 26, 2019), 
https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2019/01/ eighteen-law-schools-would-fail-
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The complicated relationships among the policies of providing 
more access to justice, increasing minority representation in the 
bar, and protecting the public from shoddy law practice have 
recently inflamed academic debate.  In the rush for assessing 
blame, some analysts have published empirically flawed reports 
that have received a great deal of media and academic attention, 
but have not received serious methodological analysis.  The 
problem is that merely believing that one variable, such as LSAT 
scores, causes results, such as lower bar examination scores 
and/or increased ethical violations, is very different than 
empirically proving that professed cause and effect relationship.  
This article responds to two of these studies: one conducted by 
Professor Kinsler in Is Bar Exam Failure a Harbinger of 
Professional Discipline?3 and another conducted by Professors 
Anderson and Muller in The High Cost of Lowering the Bar.4  
These studies concluded that there is either a causal link and/or 
a correlation between par passage scores and the probability of 
state bar disciplinary rates.  Both studies argue for more 
 
abas-proposed-75-bar-passage-within-2-years-accreditation-standard.html; David 
Frakt, ABA Standard 316 Gets Shot Down Again – Here’s How To Fix It, FAC. 
LOUNGE (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.thefacultylounge.org/2019/01/aba-standard-
316-gets-shot-down-again-heres-how-to-fix-it.html; David Frakt, Recent Bar Pass 
Rates – A Cautionary Tale, FAC. LOUNGE (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.thefaculty 
lounge.org/2018/11/recent-bar-pass-rates-a-cautionary-tale.html; Bernie Burk, How 
the Legal Academy Has Changed Since the Great Recession (Hint – It’s Probably a 
Lot More than You Think), FAC. LOUNGE (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.the 
facultylounge.org/2018/09/how-the-legal-academy-has-changed-since-the-great-
recession-hint-its-probably-a-lot-more-than-you-th.html; David Frakt, Lessons from 
the 2018 ABA Bar Passage Data Spreadsheet: Part 1, FAC. LOUNGE (Mar. 26, 2018), 
https://www.thefacultylounge.org/2018/03/lessons-from-the-2018-aba-bar-passage-
data-spreadsheet-part-1-.html; David Frakt, Lessons from the 2018 ABA Bar 
Passage Data Spreadsheet: Part 2, FAC. LOUNGE (Mar. 26, 2018), 
https://www.thefacultylounge.org/2018/03/lessons-from-the-2018-aba-bar-passage-
data-spreadsheet-part-2.html; David Frakt, Lessons from the 2018 ABA Bar Passage 
Data Spreadsheet: Part 3 – A Proposal to Change Bar Pass Standard 316, FAC. 
LOUNGE (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.thefacultylounge.org/2018/03/lessons-from-
the-2018-aba-bar-passage-data-spreadsheet-part-3.html; David Frakt, Lessons from 
the 2018 ABA Bar Passage Data Spreadsheet: Part 4 – Anomalies and Deceptions, 
FAC. LOUNGE (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.thefacultylounge.org/2018/03/lessons-
from-the-2018-aba-bar-passage-data-spreadsheet-part-4-anomalies-and-deceptions 
.html. 
3 Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Is Bar Exam Failure a Harbinger of Professional 
Discipline?, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 883, 922 (2017). 
4 Robert Anderson IV & Derek T. Muller, The High Cost of Lowering the Bar, 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS (forthcoming) (manuscript at 21–22), https://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=2977359. 
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restrictive access to law schools or, alternatively, for more 
regulation of the legal stream leading to membership in the bar.  
Their data does not support their drastic remedies.   
I. THE KINSLER STUDY 
Professor Kinsler’s claim is simple: he states that a higher 
percentage of attorneys who failed the bar exam multiple times 
commit more ethical violations in their early careers than other 
attorneys.5  Because he concludes that multiple bar examination 
attorneys are a danger to the public, he proposes that states limit 
the number of bar examination attempts applicants can take.6 
Although Kinsler details the careers of attorneys that he 
says prove his bar exam and ethical violation thesis, there is a 
glaring omission—Kinsler did not discuss a single case in which 
an attorney who took the bar exam multiple times was found to 
have violated a disciplinary rule early in his or her career 
involving any of the five skills he claims are tested on bar 
examinations.  He failed to demonstrate any nexus between 
multiple bar exam failures and attorney disciplinary violations. 
In addition, Kinsler fails to provide sufficient empirical data 
to support his proposition that multiple bar examination 
attorneys have a different pattern of disciplinary violations early 
in their careers.  In fact, a Connecticut ethics study cited by 
Kinsler found that all attorneys who committed ethical 
violations, not just those who failed the bar exam, committed 
most ethical violations during what Kinsler terms “early” in their 
careers.7  In Connecticut, “the average length of time between 
admission and the filing of a grievance leading to a sanction was 
10.74 years.”8  Kinsler’s logical leap in connecting the timing of 
multiple bar exam test taker discipline “early in their careers” to 
their lack of bar exam performance fails since almost all 
disciplinary cases for all attorneys occur during that same time 
frame.9 
 
5 Kinsler, supra note 3, at 885. 
6 Id. at 917–18. 
7 Kinsler, supra note 3, at 900; Leslie C. Levin et al., A Study of the Relationship 
Between Bar Admissions Data and Subsequent Lawyer Discipline 9 (Mar. 15, 2013), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2258164. 
8 Levin et al., supra note 7, at 16. 
9 Kinsler, supra note 3, at 899. Kinsler’s time period includes discipline “in the 
first few years—ranging from two years to twelve years—of their legal careers.” Id. 
at 893. 
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The most fatal flaw in Kinsler’s argument and data is that 
he did not produce evidence to demonstrate the level of 
correlation between multiple bar attempts and ethical violations.  
To illustrate his empirical failure, consider the following facts: 
from February 2012 to February 2018, men tended to have a 
lower “first-time” and a lower “repeater” (multiple bar exam) 
passage rate than women did on the California Bar 
Examination.10  The problem is that even though there is a 
correlation between gender and the frequency of ethical 
violations, the correlation is so low that it does not warrant 
dramatic changes to the bar examination.11  For instance, a study 
of the disciplinary patterns of Connecticut attorneys found that 
men are 2.5% more likely to be disciplined by the state bar than 
women are.12  However, the authors of that study cautioned that 
the slight predictive variable of gender on discipline does not 
warrant reliance on that variable to alter public policy, much less 
to frame a drastic remedy like Kinsler’s to limit the number of 
times men can take a bar exam.13 
Kinsler not only failed to demonstrate a significant 
relationship between multiple bar examination attempts and 
ethical violations, but also failed to consider other possible 
correlations with bar exam failure and attorney discipline.  One 
could speculate that there are so many marginally correlated 
variables with ethical violations that they lose any predictive 
value.  For instance, “in 2004, Klein and Bolus reported in a 
study of the Texas Bar Examination that applicants who worked 
while preparing for the bar examination earned about 15 total 
scale score points less than their classmates with comparable 
 
10 See California State Bar Examination Statistics, STATE BAR OF CAL., 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Admissions/Law-School-Regulation/Exam-Statistics. 
During that period, women scored better than men on eight of thirteen exams as 
first time test takers and better on eight out of twelve exams as repeat test takers. 
Id. 
11 Anderson & Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 18) (agreeing that such 
gender differences on bar passage rates do not support changes to bar admission 
standards). The professors state, “[E]ven though men are subject to higher discipline 
rates, one would not suggest restricting the practice of law based on gender.” Id. 
(footnote omitted). 
12 Leslie C. Levin et. al., The Questionable Character of the Bar’s Character and 
Fitness Inquiry, 40 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 51, 66 (2015). 
13 Id. at 52, 62–63, 75–76. 
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LSAT scores and LSGPA who were not working.”14  This fact 
certainly does not imply that poorer students, who have to work 
during bar preparation study, should be denied a chance to 
repeat the bar examination. 
Nonetheless, Kinsler claims that his data demonstrates that: 
(1) [t]he more times it takes a lawyer to pass the bar exam the 
more likely that lawyer will be disciplined for ethical violations, 
particularly early in the lawyer’s career; and (2) [t]he more 
times it takes a lawyer to pass the bar exam the more likely 
that lawyer will be disciplined for lack of diligence—including 
noncommunication—and/or incompetence.15 
The problem, as the following analysis will demonstrate, is 
that Kinsler’s empirical data does not support either of his 
claims.  In addition, in some instances Kinsler’s reliance on his 
empirical data is extremely misleading, especially since he 
omitted highly relevant data from some of the sources he relies 
on. 
Kinsler offers specific examples of attorneys he identified 
that took the bar exam multiple times and had disciplinary 
records within the first twelve years of their careers.16  The 
following section demonstrates that Kinsler’s attorney examples 
fail to prove any causal relationship between poor bar exam 
performance and excessive disciplinary violations by those re-
takers.  A second fatal flaw of Kinsler’s study is that he fails to 
establish a correlation between the factual basis for the attorney 
disciplinary cases he discusses and the topics actually tested on 
the bar examination. 
A. Kinsler Mischaracterized the Specific Cases of Attorney 
Discipline That He Used To Support His Hypothesis 
1. The Filer Case Study 
One would think that if attorneys who passed the bar exam 
after multiple attempts frequently commit ethical violations, 
Kinsler would easily find examples to demonstrate his thesis that 
poor performance on bar exam topics predicts higher attorney 
 
14 Roger Bolus, Performance Changes on the California Bar Examination: Part 
2, STATE BAR OF CAL. 1, 63 (Dec. 20, 2018), http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/ 
documents/admissions/Examinations/Bar-Exam-Report-Final.pdf. 
15 Kinsler, supra note 3, at 922. 
16 Id. at 893. 
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ethical violations.  However, the few examples of disciplinary 
cases he discusses have little, if any, correspondence to the topics 
frequently covered on standard bar examinations. 
Kinsler apparently chose to discuss the case of Max D. Filer17 
first for dramatic and hyperbolic effect since Filer took the 
California Bar Examination forty-eight times,18 even though 
Filer’s first ethical violation did not occur until he had practiced 
law for ten years.19  Kinsler never discusses the other variables 
beyond failing the bar examination that may have contributed to 
Filer’s disciplinary action, such as medical or family problems.  
Kinsler states that in 2001, ten years after admission, Filer was 
disciplined “for not performing competently” and again in 2005 
was disciplined for failing “to perform legal services 
competently.”20   
First, the obvious problem is that the 2005 disciplinary case 
occurred outside of Kinsler’s definition of “early career” since it 
was in Filer’s fourteenth year of legal practice.21  Second, Kinsler 
also failed to demonstrate that Filer’s two disciplinary actions 
 
17 Diane Curtis, Advice from One Who Failed Bar Exam 47 Times: Try Again, 
Again and Again, CAL. ST. B. J. (Feb. 2004), http://archive.calbar.ca.gov/archive/ 
Archive.aspx?articleId=54802&categoryId=54503&month=2&year=2004. 
18 Id. 
19 Kinsler provides no empirical support for classifying ethical violations more 
than a decade after admission to the bar as ones as occurring “early in their legal 
careers.” Aditionally, Kinsler could have demonstrated that government or state bar 
organizations define the term “early in careers” as a term of art or as a customary 
term within the industry. For example, “early career” is defined as the first five 
years of a career in determining which scholars qualify for research grants in the 
United Kingdom. See Assessment Framework and Guidance on Submissions, 
RESEARCH EXCELLENCE FRAMEWORK 1, 19 (July 2011), http://www.fapesp.br/ 
avaliacao/manuais/ref_guidelines.pdf (stating that for the 2014 Research Excellence 
Framework an early career researcher must have started their careers on or after 
August 1, 2009). The “early research grants” for the National Institute of Health are 
formulated such that “[t]he 7 year eligibility period will be calculated based on the 
MM/DD/YYYY the degree was awarded.” Department of Health and Human Services 
Part 1. Overview Information, NAT’L INST. HEALTH (Feb. 9, 2017) https://grants. 
nih.gov/grants/guide/pa-files/PAR-17-161.html #_3._Additional_Information. The 
author has not been able to find a single official definition of “early career” that is 
consistent with Kinsler’s expanded definition that includes incidents occurring 
during the first twelve years of one’s career. The problem, of course, is that if Kinsler 
were to use a more recognized definition of “early career,” the examples of attorney 
discipline that he used would not fit as cases of early career disciplinary violations. 
20 Kinsler, supra note 3, at 884 & n.12. 
21 See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also Kinsler, supra note 3, at 
883, 884 n.12 (stating Maxcy D. Filer passed the bar in 1991, while he was 
disciplined fourteen years later in 2005). 
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are correlated to the subjects and skills tested by the California 
Bar Examination.  All that Kinsler reports about Filer’s 
disciplinary cases was that he was found to have failed “to 
perform legal services competently.”22  Kinsler conveniently left 
out of his article the actual nature of Filer’s 2001 and 2005 
“incompetency” disciplinary cases. 
According to the California State Bar, Filer was disciplined 
in 2001 for failing to file a proof of service for a client.23  Filer was 
found to have violated California Rules of Professional Conduct, 
Rule 3-110(A), which in 1991 stated that “[a] member shall not 
intentionally, or with reckless disregard, or repeatedly fail to 
perform legal services competently.”24  However, failing to file a 
proof of service has little to do with failing the California Bar 
Exam.  The California Bar Examination does not test the legal 
timing for filing a proof of service in a divorce action.25 
Filer’s 2005 disciplinary action, which occurred beyond 
Kinsler’s own definition of “early career,” was also for failing to 
file proof of service.26  Again, although the State Bar found that 
Filer failed to perform his legal services “competently,” that 
incompetence involved a lack of diligence, not a failure to 
understand and implement a topic covered by the California Bar 
Examination.27  Kinsler also failed to discuss the facts 
surrounding Filer’s 2005 failure to file the proof of service.  In 
2005, Filer was seventy-four years old and had been ill for 
several years, which prevented him from fulfilling his 
 
22 Kinsler, supra note 3, at 884 n.12. 
23 Suspension/Probation, CAL. ST. B. J. (Aug. 2005), http://archive.calbar.ca.gov/ 
archive/Archive.aspx?articleld=70768&categoryId=70682&month=8&year=2005; see 
also The State Bar of Cal. Office of the Chief Trial Counsel Enforcement v. Maxcy D. 
Filer, State Bar Court of the State Bar of California, Hearing Department 
Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Deposition and Order Approving 
Stayed Suspension; No Actual Suspension, filed October 21, 2004 in case number 04-
0-12425, at p. 2. (copy obtained from the State Bar Court in author’s possession). 
24 CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3-110 (STATE BAR OF CAL. 1989). 
25 Scope of the California Bar Examination, STATE BAR OF CAL., 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Admissions/Examinations/California-Bar-Examination/ 
California-Bar-Examination-Scope (last visited May 22, 2019). 
26 See Suspension/Probation, supra note 23 (discussing Filer’s 2005 violation 
and subsequent stipulation). 
27 The State Bar of Cal. Office of the Chief Trial Counsel Enforcement v. Maxcy 
D. Filer, State Bar Court of the State Bar of California, Hearing Department 
Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Deposition and Order Approving 
Stayed Suspension; No Actual Suspension, filed October 21, 2004 in case number 04-
0-12425, at p. 2. (copy obtained from the State Bar Court in author’s possession). 
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professional lawyer duties.28  Although illness is not an excuse for 
negligent advocacy, such a failure to file a document while ill has 
no correspondence to the bar exam.  As it turns out, Kinsler’s 
posterchild for the correlation between multiple bar exam 
failures and early career disciplinary proceedings was an old man 
who wrongfully abandoned a client due in large part to his 
illness. 
Kinsler, apparently content with using Filer as his 
bar-failing, incompetent attorney flag-bearer, decided to keep the 
most interesting facts about this lawyer’s life undisclosed.  Filer 
grew up as a black man who lived “a segregated childhood in 
Marianna, Ark[ansas].”29  Filer moved to Compton, California, a 
demographically black neighborhood where “[h]e helped organize 
and was president of the Compton chapter of the NAACP.  He 
proudly carried the California flag in the 1963 March on 
Washington with Martin Luther King Jr.  He later carried the 
same flag in King’s funeral procession.”30  Filer served in the U.S. 
Navy from 1946 to 1949, and he was a Compton city councilman 
from 1976 to 1991.31  Filer tirelessly fought for civil rights in 
Compton’s Neighborhood Legal Services office and at the 
Community Redevelopment Agency, and he testified at the 
McCone Commission regarding the causes and solutions 
regarding the Watts Riots.32 
Kinsler’s many omissions regarding Filer’s pre- and post-law 
degree life, and regarding the factual predicates of his bar 
discipline, demonstrate his questionable and methodologically 
biased research.  He did not discuss the true nature of Filer’s 
 
28 Curtis, supra note 17. See also Maxcy Filer, Persistent Tackler of Bar Exam, 
Dies at 80, METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE (Jan 11, 2011), http://www.metnews. 
com/articles/2011/obit011111.htm. Before the 2005 disciplinary case, Filer “began 
having health problems that prevented him from fulfilling his responsibilities.” Id. 
29 David Margolick, At the Bar; A Man’s Pride and Persistence Conquer the 
California Bar Exam’s Most Famous Losing Streak, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1991), 
https://www.nytimes.com/ 
1991/09/13/news/bar-man-s-pride-persistence-conquer-california-bar-exam-s-most-
famous-losing.html. 
30 Curtis, supra note 17. 
 31 Yussuf J. Simmonds, Maxcy Filer, a Legend . . . STRAIGHT OUTTA 
COMPTON, L.A. SENTINEL (Jan. 13, 2011), https://lasentinel.net/maxcy-filer-a-
legend-straight-outta-compton.html. 
32  Id.; Ann M. Simmons, Maxcy Dean Filer dies at 80; ‘Mr. Compton’ served on 
City Council and Sought to Empower Blacks, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2011), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2011-jan-15-la-me-maxcy-filer-20110115-
story.html. 
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disciplinary incompetency—failing to file two proofs of service.  
He not discuss Filer’s age and health as a possible cause of his 
abandoning his client in 2005.  He even failed to discuss whether 
the California Bar Examination frequently tests the substantive 
nature of his ethical violation—failure to file a proof of service.  
Kinsler simply did not demonstrate that the Filer case fits his 
speculation that failing a bar exam multiple times is correlated 
with more disciplinary violations during the first twelve years of 
a lawyer’s career. 
Kinsler is also silent regarding the impact of his drastic 
remedy, which would have prevented attorneys like Filer from 
getting a license to practice law.  He does not discuss a 
cost-benefit analysis between the benefits that Filer provided to 
the hundreds of poor clients he represented versus the two 
ethical violations that led to his state bar discipline. 
2. The DeZell Case 
Kinsler’s second posterchild for multiple bar exam failures 
and early disciplinary violations is John DeZell, who passed the 
Oregon bar examination on his “tenth attempt.”33  The only 
information that Kinsler provides regarding DeZell’s disciplinary 
violation is that he “was suspended in 1995 for three years for 
neglecting multiple legal matters and incompetence.”34  Kinsler 
failed to discuss the factual bases for DeZell’s state bar discipline 
and did not even attempt to show a correlation between those 
violations and DeZell’s failure of subjects tested on the Oregon 
Bar Examination. 
DeZell was charged with four disciplinary counts.35  In Count 
I, he was alleged to have failed to timely file a complaint and 
provide the client with a trust fund accounting.36  In Count II, 
DeZell was alleged to have improperly filed a “Notice of Appeal, 
one day beyond the statutory deadline” and failed to properly 
serve that notice.37  In Count III, he was charged with failure “to 
maintain client property in a place of safekeeping, and failed to 
promptly pay or deliver to his client funds . . . that she was 
 
33 Kinsler, supra note 3, at 883. 
34 Id. at 884 n.12. 
35 In re Dezell, 9 DB Rptr 143, 146–47 (Or. 1995). 
36 Id. at 146. 
37 Id. at 147. 
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entitled to receive.”38  Finally, in Count IV, DeZell was charged 
with representing two clients where there was a clear conflict of 
interest and failing to obtain his clients’ consent to that conflict 
of interest.39  Most of DeZell’s ethical violations relate to topics 
covered on the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam 
(“MPRE”), not the bar examination.40 
Kinsler’s reference to other attorneys who took the bar 
examination multiple times provides no support for his theory.  
He includes Paulina Bandy as another example of why states 
should have a maximum limit on the number of times applicants 
can sit for the bar since she “passed the California bar exam on 
her fourteenth attempt.”41  However, Kinsler did not tell the rest 
of the story about Ms. Bandy perhaps because it would present a 
case of a multi-test taker who did not fit his model of the 
negligent or incompetent advocate.  What Kinsler left out is that 
even though Ms. Bandy took the bar exam fourteen times, during 
her “early career,” from 2008 to 2018, she had no state bar 
disciplinary actions.42 
Kinsler also used the case of Kevin D. Callahan to 
demonstrate the absurdity of permitting repeated attempts to 
pass a bar exam.  He states that “Callahan failed the 
Massachusetts Bar Exam ten times.”43  Again, Kinsler only 
presents “straw-man” arguments and does not discuss any facts 
in the examples that he uses that could weaken his crusade to rid 
the United States of multi-bar examination test takers.  What he 
did not disclose is that Mr. Callahan was admitted to practice 
law in Massachusetts in 1990, but during the twenty-eight years 
of Callahan’s legal practice, there are no reports of any 
disciplinary proceedings against him.44 
 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 147–48. 
40 See MPRE Subject Matter Outline, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM’RS 
(2013), http://www.ncbex.org/pdfviewer/?file=%2Fdmsdocument%2F2. 
41 Kinsler, supra note 3, at 901. 
42 See Attorney Licensee Profile for Paulina Louise Bandy, License Number 
255002, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/Licensee/Detail/255002 
(last visited June 1, 2019). 
43 Kinsler, supra note 3, at 901. 
44 At the time of this of writing, neither the Massachusetts Board of Bar 
Overseers records database nor the Board’s Disciplinary Decision index has 
indicated any history of disciplinary proceedings against Kevin D. Callahan. See 
Attorney Licensee Profile For Kevin D. Callahan, Board of Bar Overseers (BBO) 
Number 557146, MASS. BD. B. OVERSEERS, https://www.massbbo.org/Attorney 
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Kinsler presents another attorney, “Marcus Wiggens [who] 
passed the California bar exam on his twenty-fourth attempt.”45  
The problem, again, is that Wiggens has never had any 
disciplinary proceedings during his legal career.46 
If Kinsler is correct that there are hundreds of multiple 
bar-test taking attorneys who pose a serious danger to the public 
because of their poor performance on the bar exam, then why did 
he not present examples of those attorneys in his analysis? 
3. Kinsler Failed To Fully Discuss the Connecticut Bar Study 
Results on Attorney Discipline 
Kinsler cited to two Connecticut State Bar studies of 
attorney discipline that attempted to isolate variables that might 
have a statistical correlation with attorney misconduct.47  Kinsler 
states that “[t]here is also anecdotal and statistical evidence 
showing that lawyers who failed the Connecticut Bar Exam were 
more likely to face discipline than lawyers who never failed that 
exam.”48  However, Kinsler did not present any of the caveats of 
the Connecticut studies which undermine his drastic remedy of 
limiting bar examination attempts.  First, the Connecticut study 
found that those who failed the bar exam were more likely to 
receive “less severe” discipline rather than “severe discipline.”49  
In fact, the Connecticut study found that attorneys who received 
severe discipline were academically “somewhat stronger than 
those who were less severely disciplined” as more “of the less 
severely disciplined lawyers attended a law school ranked in the 
bottom half” compared to the severely disciplined lawyers.50  
Under Kinsler’s public policy rationale, since academically better 
performing students who attended better law schools are a  
 
 
 
Lookup?bbonumber=557146 (last visited June 1, 2019); Disciplinary Decisions, 
MASS. BD. OF BAR OVERSEERS, https://www.massbbo.org/Decisions (last visited June 
1, 2019). 
45 Kinsler, supra note 3, at 900. 
46 See Attorney Licensee Profile for Marcus B. Wiggins, License Number 
272501, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/Licensee/Detail/272501 
(last visited June 1, 2019). 
47 See Kinsler, supra note 3, at 900 n.99. 
48 Id. at 900. 
49 Levin et al., supra note 12, at 70. 
50 Id. 
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serious danger to the public, they should not be admitted to the 
bar even though they passed the bar examination on their first 
attempt. 
Kinsler also failed to discuss several other findings in the 
Connecticut study that rebut his suppositions: 
B. No Predictive Correlation Between Multi Bar Test Taking and 
Disciplinary Action Early in an Attorney’s Career 
One of Kinsler’s primary claims is that “early career” 
multiple bar test takers commit ethical violations at rates 
significantly greater than attorneys who passed the bar exam on 
the first or second attempt.51  He structures his argument as 
follows: 
1. Law students with lesser intellectual abilities perform 
worse in law school; 
2. Those who do poorly in law school are more likely to fail 
the bar exam multiple times; 
3. Those who fail the bar exam multiple times are predicted 
to commit more ethical violations; and finally, 
4. That subset of attorneys are much more likely to commit 
their ethical violations early in their careers.52 
The problem is that Kinsler failed to discuss the empirical 
data contained in the Connecticut study that rebuts his attorney 
discipline predictive model.  First, that study found that LSAT 
scores have no correlation with attorney discipline.53  The 
Connecticut study rebuts Kinsler’s intuition that academically 
weaker students are predicted to commit statistically 
significantly more ethical violations.54  In addition, the study 
found that attending a low-ranked law school had almost no 
correlation with predictive ethical violations and only increased 
the likelihood of discipline by “1.7 percentage points.”55 
The Connecticut study also rebuts Kinsler’s temporal 
predictive model in which he claims that “lawyers who repeatedly 
fail the bar exam are more likely to be disciplined for 
incompetence early in their legal careers.”56  What Kinsler did 
 
 51 Kinsler, supra note 3, at 885. 
52 Id. 
53 Levin et al., supra note 12, at 67. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Kinsler, supra note 3, at 892. 
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not include in his analysis is that the Connecticut study found 
that for all disciplined attorneys the average time between 
admission to the bar and a disciplinary sanction was 10.7 years.57  
In other words, the Connecticut study did not find that length of 
time practicing law was a variable that correlated with 
distinctions among attorney disciplinary records. 
C. Kinsler Stacks the Empirical Deck by Overgeneralizing the 
Categories of Ethical Misconduct He Relies on in His Attempt 
To Prove a Cause and Effect Relationship Between the 
Number of Bar Exams Taken and Attorney Incompetence 
Kinsler defines two types of attorney misconduct that he is 
investigating.  First, he defines “client neglect” as both 
“non-diligence and failure to communicate.”58  His second 
category is “competence” or “incompetence.”59  The problem is 
that Kinsler never defines the term competence and often just 
lumps and cumulates statistics on what he terms “neglect and/or 
incompetence.”60  Consequently, it is impossible to track the 
different types of misconduct or the cause and effect and/or 
correlations among his data and the skills and substantive 
knowledge actually tested on bar examinations.  This is a fatal 
methodological flaw because it substantially exaggerates the 
number of disciplinary cases correlated with subjects tested on 
bar examinations. 
However, Kinsler does outline the skills inherent in the 
definition of “competency” under Rule 1.1: 
1.  specific knowledge about the fields of law in which the 
lawyer practices; 
2.  performance of the techniques of practice with skill; 
3.  identification of areas beyond the lawyer’s competence 
and bringing those areas to the client’s attention; 
4.  proper preparation; and 
5.  attention to details and schedules necessary to assure 
that the matter undertaken is completed with no 
avoidable harm to the client’s interest.61 
 
57 Levin et al., supra note 12, at 61. 
58 Kinsler, supra note 3, at 886. 
59 Id. at 884–85, 891–92, 895, 898, 922. 
60 Id. at 898. 
61 Id. at 891 (quoting N.H. R. RPC Rule 1.1(b)). 
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He next claims that the skills required under Rule 1.1 
competency are the same as those tested on the bar exam: 
1.  Recognition, characterization and articulation of the 
issues; 
2.  Analysis and evaluation of the facts presented in the 
light of those issues; 
3.  Recognition and statement of the rules, standards or 
principles of law pertinent to those issues, including 
qualifications and limitations; 
4.  Application of the law to the facts and reasoning to a 
sound conclusion; and 
5.  Coherent communication of such analysis and 
reasoning.62 
What Kinsler apparently fails to understand is that state bar 
disciplinary boards and courts do not use the terms “competent,” 
“competency,” or “incompetency” when referring to only acts or 
omissions solely related to the five areas that Kinsler admits are 
tested on the bar examination.  As was demonstrated in Part I, 
almost all of the cases that Kinsler presented as examples of 
attorneys’ lack of competence were in reality cases in which an 
attorney failed to perform an act, such as filing a court document.  
However, such issues like client neglect are not subjects included 
in the five categories Kinsler states are tested on the bar 
examination.  In fact, the fifth category that Kinsler lists as an 
example of incompetent lawyering under Rule 1.1, “attention to 
details and schedules necessary to assure that the matter 
undertaken is completed with no avoidable harm to the client’s 
interest,”63 is not even listed by Kinsler as a topic covered on bar 
examinations. 
The most common areas of attorney discipline—failure to 
properly communicate with clients, trust fund violations, drug 
and alcohol violations, and misrepresentation64—are rarely 
 
62 Id. at 892. 
63 Id. at 891. (quoting N.H. R. RPC Rule 1.1(b)). 
64 For instance, in Tennessee from July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2018, neglect 
and failure to communicate with clients constituted between fifty-two percent and 
fifty-eight percent of disciplinary cases, relationships with clients and courts were 
nine to ten percent, trust violations were eight percent, and misrepresentation and 
fraud were eight percent. 36th Annual Discipline Report, TENN. BD. OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY (2016–2017), at 5, http://www.tbpr.org/news-publications/annual-
reports [hereinafter 36th Annual Discipline Report]; 37th Annual Discipline Report, 
TENN. BD. PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (2017-2018), at 3, http://www.tbpr.org/news-
publications/annual-reports [hereinafter 37th Annual Discipline Report]. 
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tested on the bar examination, as opposed to on the MPRE ethics 
exam.  And when tested on the bar exam, professional 
responsibility issues comprise a very small percentage of the 
points on bar examination questions.  It is odd that Kinsler, 
Anderson, and Muller did not use the MPRE to determine 
whether there is a correlation between low scores on that test 
and patterns of attorney discipline rather than relying on data 
from the general bar examination.65 
The California State Bar has published previous test 
questions and sample answers from the July 2012 through the 
July 2018 bar examinations.66  After analyzing each of the dozens 
of California Bar Examination essay questions and suggested 
answers from that period, it is clear that the exam almost never 
tests the substance of the types of ethical violations relied on by 
Kinsler as proof of a connection between bar exam failure and 
higher disciplinary rates.67  In addition, if a bar exam question 
tests disciplinary issues discussed by Kinsler such as the failure 
to perform a required act, the points value of such an issue is 
very slight in relation to the total points for each question and is 
very minimal in relation to all of the subjects and questions on 
that bar examination.68  For instance, the topic of trust account 
 
65 See Anderson & Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 15) (admitting that the 
“relationship between scores on the multistate professional responsibility exam 
(MPRE) and career discipline rates is also worth investigating”). 
66 The California Bar maintains a database of previous examination questions 
and sample answers. Past Exams, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://www.calbar.ca.gov/ 
Admissions/Examinations/California-Bar-Examination/Past-Exams#examquestions 
(last visited June 1, 2019). 
67 Id. 
68 For instance, one question on California’s February 2012 exam concerned 
professional responsibility. Id. However, that question only concerned illegal 
attorney advertising, witness fees, client solicitation, and fee sharing, which are not 
topics included in Kinsler’s examples of attorney discipline. Id. The July 2012 exam 
had a short question on professional responsibility regarding attorneys entering 
business deals with clients and unconscionable attorney fees. Id. The February 2013 
exam had a question addressing the duty of fairness, confidentiality, and duty to 
communicate. Id. The July 2013 exam had issues involving the duty to have 
expertise in the substantive area of a client’s case, the formation of the attorney-
client relationship, fees, confidentiality and communication, improper influence and 
perjury. Id. The February 2014 exam had issues involving press releases, the duty of 
a prosecutor, lack of candor, discovery, and ex parte communications. Id. The July 
2014 exam contained issues of the scope of representation, fairness to opposing 
counsel, loyalty, candor, and confidentiality. Id. The February 2015 had no 
professional responsibility issues. Id. The July 2015 exam tested loyalty, care, and 
fiduciary duties to clients. Id. The February 2016 exam concerned sexual relations 
with clients, loyalty, expertise in subject area of representation, forcing clients to 
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violations, the leading ground for ethical discipline in California, 
was tested on only one question during the fourteen different bar 
exams administered from 2012 through 2018.69  Furthermore, I 
was unable to find a single question that focused on an attorney’s 
failure to file an action within the statute of limitations, one of 
the types of disciplinary actions significantly relied on by Kinsler. 
Moreover, that is the heart of the matter in Kinsler’s 
research.  Most of the cases he cites relate to a type of 
competency—lack of diligence—used by disciplinary tribunals 
and infrequently tested on bar examinations.70  Therefore, 
Kinsler’s data provides no empirical connection between most 
types of disciplinary cases and attorneys’ lack of skills as tested 
on a bar examination. 
The problem is that when Kinsler refers to or analyzes 
attorney disciplinary cases in which he illustrates attorney 
“incompetency,” he never specifies the acts that led a state bar to 
discipline the attorney.  He does not discuss whether that finding 
of incompetency correlates with one or more of the five areas of 
competency tested on the bar exam.  Kinsler recognizes that 
some instances of attorney neglect are classified as incompetency 
cases by state bar disciplinary codes even though that finding of 
incompetency has no relationship to the five types of 
 
waive their rights, court appearances, trust funds, and fee agreements. Id. The July 
2016 exam tested formation of an attorney client relationship, corporations as 
clients, loyalty, conflicts, knowledge of substantive law, confidentiality and candor. 
Id. The February 2017 exam involved issues of loyalty, withdrawal, frivolousness, 
fees, communication, investigation, returning client’s property. Id. The July 2017 
exam tested privilege, work product, fees, confidentiality, fairness, loyalty, and 
withdrawal. Id. The February 2018 exam included issues of candor, false testimony, 
and attorney as a witness. Id. The July 2018 exam tested loyalty, conflicts, 
substantive expertise, confidentiality, and fees. Id. 
69 See California Bar Exam February 2016, STATE BAR OF CAL., 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/admissions/Examinations/February20
16CBX_Questions_R.pdf. 
70 For instance, in 2017 in New Jersey the disciplinary cases involved the 
following factual violations: (1) dishonesty, fraud, and misrepresentation: 16.7%; 
(2) criminal convictions: 16%; (3) misappropriation of client funds: 15.4%; (4) trust 
fund violations: 10.3%; (5) gross neglect and incompetence: 9%; (6) conflict of 
interest: 6.4%; (7) non-cooperation with bar proceedings: 5.1%; (8) fee violations: 
4.5%; (9) lack of communication: 3.8%; (10) ineligible practice of law: 3.8%; and 
(11) unauthorized practice of law: 2.6%. 2017 State of the Attorney Disciplinary 
System Report, SUPREME COURT OF N.J. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY ETHICS,  at 13–17, 
https://www.njcourts.gov/attorneys/assets/oae/2017oaeannualrpt.pdf?cacheID=aNU1
La. 
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incompetency tested on the bar exam.71  Therefore, he admits 
that some incompetency disciplinary cases bear no relationship 
with the bar examination and do not provide support for his 
claims that multiple bar examination test takers’ ethics 
violations are predicted by bar exam performance. 
The author has not been able to find any evidence that 
attorney incompetence based on Kinsler’s five areas of bar 
examination testing comprise even a small percentage of 
attorney discipline cases nationally.72  For instance, I searched 
for all disciplinary cases published on the Alabama State Bar 
database that contain the words “competent,” “competency,” 
“incompetent,” or “incompetency,” and found that only nine 
disciplinary cases were reported.73  In the first case, on 
September 4, 2018, an attorney was reprimanded for failing to 
timely file an appellate brief.74  Although the attorney was found 
to have acted incompetently, that incompetence does not fit 
under Kinsler’s five state bar exam tested areas.  In the second 
case, on May 20, 2013, an attorney was found incompetent for 
making false statements to the court, misappropriating client 
funds, failing to attend hearings, and practicing outside his 
substantive expertise. 75  Based on my own study of the California 
 
71 Kinsler, supra note 3, at 891. 
72 In some State Bar Organization reports on attorney discipline the category of 
“incompetent” or “incompetence” is not even used. For instance, each year the 
Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility issues an annual Disciplinary Report 
that charts the types of disciplinary infractions litigated by the Board that year. In 
the July 1, 2017 through June 30, 2018 and July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017 
reports, the Board does not even include a category for incompetency. See 37th 
Annual Discipline Report, supra note 64; 36th Annual Discipline Report, supra note 
64. Instead, the Board reported that of the complaints received in 2017 and 2018, 
fifty-two percent involved “neglect or failure to communicate;” eight percent were 
“trust violations;” eight percent were “misrepresentation or fraud;” six percent were 
for “fees;” two percent were “criminal convictions;” four percent were for “conflict of 
interest;” nine percent were disputes over “relationship with client or court;” and two 
percent were for “personal behavior.” 37th Annual Discipline Report, supra note 64, 
at 5. The July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2017 statistics were very similar and did not 
include any specific data on incompetency. 36th Annual Discipline Report, supra 
note 64. 
73 On October 23, 2018, I searched for variations of the word “incompetence” in 
Alabama State Bar’s disciplinary case database. Only nine results were found. 
Discipline History, ALA. STATE BAR, http://alabar.org/resources/office-of-general-
counsel/disciplinary-history (last searched Oct. 23, 2018). 
74  Id. (searching keywords “appellate brief” and “timely file” together) (last 
accessed Mar. 1, 2019). 
75  Id. (searching keywords “false statements” and “misappropriated” together) 
(last accessed Mar. 1, 2019). 
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Bar Examination, these topics, such as substantive expertise, 
were not frequently tested; other state bar examinations may be 
similarly situated.  In the third case, on October 9, 2013, the 
Alabama State Bar reprimanded an attorney for “failing to 
provide competent representation to [a] client” because the 
attorney “failed to timely file an application for rehearing.”76  
Again, this incompetency does not involve a bar exam tested area 
of law.  In the fourth case, the lawyer, on April 1, 2014, was 
found to have “fail[ed] to provide competent representation as he 
did not possess a license to practice law in the other state and 
failed to appear at the client’s arraignment.”77  Again, this is not 
a bar exam topic.  In the fifth case, on January 9, 2015, a lawyer 
was found to be incompetent because he was under the influence 
of narcotics during the representation.78  In the sixth case, on 
March 13, 2015, an attorney was reprimanded because he failed 
to file a witness list, failed to take a deposition, and failed to file 
any motions for his client.79  Again, these are not bar tested 
areas.  In the seventh case, on January 8, 2016, an attorney was 
reprimanded for incompetence because he filed the wrong 
immigration form for his client.80  In the eighth case, on January 
19, 2016, an attorney was found incompetent for appointing an 
incorrect person as an estate’s personal representative and for 
withdrawing from the case without refunding the clients’ fee or 
correcting his error.81  Again, these are not bar exam topics.  
Finally, in the ninth case, on June 25, 2018, an attorney was 
found incompetent for filing documents “containing erroneous 
information” and he “filed a deed contrary to an order issued by 
the Court.”82  Again, the ninth case, like the other eight examples 
of disciplinary actions in Alabama, did not involve any of 
 
76 Id. (searching keywords “competent representation”) (last accessed Mar. 25, 
2019). 
77 Id. (searching minimum date field for “Apr. 1, 2014,” then searching 
maximum date field for “Apr. 1, 2014,” and searching keyword/exact phrase field for 
“competent”) (last accessed Mar. 25, 2019). 
78 Id. (searching minimum date field for “Jan. 9, 2015,” then searching 
maximum date field for “Jan. 9, 2015,” and searching keyword/exact phrase field for 
“competent”) (last accessed Mar. 25, 2019). 
79 Id. (search minimum date field for “Mar. 13, 2015,” then searching maximum 
date field for “Mar. 13, 2015,” and searching keyword/exact phrase field for 
“competence”) (last accessed Mar. 25, 2019). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
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Kinsler’s five areas of bar examination testing.  Even so, these 
cases would likely have been included in his research since at 
first blush they fit into his category of “non-diligence and/or 
incompetence.” 
Kinsler’s failure to define and distinguish cases of neglect 
from cases of incompetence regarding bar exam tested skills and 
substance makes it impossible for him to demonstrate that his 
empirical evidence proves a cause and effect or correlative 
relationship between multiple bar exam failures and attorney 
discipline.  The following hypothetical illustrates this critical 
methodological error: assume that a researcher studied attorney 
misconduct cases in California for a decade.  She reports that she 
found one hundred cases in which young career attorneys who 
took the bar exam multiple times were disciplined for neglect 
and/or incompetence.  She does not disclose the actual acts that 
led to discipline or how many specific cases involved neglect and 
the number of cases that involved incompetence related to 
subjects frequently tested on the bar. 
Does her data prove causation and/or correlation between 
bar exam failure and attorney discipline?  It clearly does not.  To 
demonstrate that relationship, the researcher must also 
demonstrate that the acts that led to disciplinary action are 
related to subjects and skills tested on the bar exam. 
Kinsler undermines his own research in two ways.  First, he 
admits that client neglect forms more than fifty percent of 
attorney disciplinary cases and no other category of attorney 
misconduct, including incompetence, comprises more than ten 
percent.83  Since issues of attorneys’ neglect in communicating 
with clients and failures to perform tasks are not frequently 
tested on the bar exam, those cases must be excluded from the 
data set used to show causation and/or correlation.  In our 
hypothetical, by applying Kinsler statistics, on average, only 10 
of the 100 cases she studied involve incompetence as opposed to 
neglect.  Second, to demonstrate causation and/or correlation, the 
hypothetical researcher must identify the nature of the ten 
incompetency disciplinary cases she studied.  Unless she can tie 
those specific types of incompetency cases to the subjects and 
skills tested by the bar exam, she cannot demonstrate that 
 
83 Kinsler, supra note 3, at 885–86. 
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failing the bar exam predicts or is correlated with disciplinary 
actions. 
Kinsler’s specific study of Tennessee bar disciplinary cases 
also has dual empirical flaws: (1) failure to properly categorize 
and itemize his two chosen types of attorney discipline, “client 
neglect” and “incompetency;” and (2) failure to demonstrate that 
those few cases involving “incompetency” are related to subjects 
and skills tested on the Tennessee bar exam. 
First, his study only analyzes sixty-nine attorneys who failed 
the Tennessee bar examination multiple times between 2005 and 
2014 and who were disciplined within two to twelve years after 
admission.84  Ironically, the most obvious empirical weakness, 
small sample size, is not the weakest part of Kinsler’s 
methodological design.  The more serious empirical flaw is that 
he did not provide a shred of evidence that any of the sixty-nine 
cases of attorney discipline involved acts related to subjects or 
skills tested on the Tennessee bar examination.  In fact, he listed 
thirteen different types of ethical violations that resulted in those 
sixty-nine attorneys being disciplined.85  Only one of those factual 
types of ethical violations, “incompetence,” might have a 
correlation with the bar exam.  I say “might” have a correlation 
with the bar exam because Kinsler did not provide any 
quantitative or qualitative information about the category of 
“incompetence” cases he relies on.  He did not provide how many 
of the sixty-nine attorneys were found to be incompetent and did 
not describe the facts surrounding any of the cases in which the 
State Bar found an attorney incompetent.  It is statistically 
impossible to determine whether there is any correlation between 
failing the bar, ethical violations, and early stages of attorneys’ 
careers in Kinsler’s data and analysis. 
 
 
84 Id. at 893–94. 
85 Id. at 895. The categories of attorney discipline listed include  
neglect, failure to communicate with clients and/or opposing counsel, 
failure to file court papers, incompetence, failure to perform work as 
promised, misrepresentation of the status of a case to clients, failure to 
timely file or refile a case, failure to attend meetings, failure to attend court 
on behalf of clients, failure to notify clients of the attorney’s suspension, 
failure to protect client interests, failure to respond to the BOPR, and 
abandonment of the attorney’s practice. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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D. Kinsler Failed To Consider the Social Justice Aspects of His 
National Rule for the Maximum Number of Bar Examination 
Attempts 
Equally troubling is Kinsler’s silence on the social justice 
results of his proposed national rule that law students can take 
the bar exam a maximum of three attempts.86  Kinsler did not 
even discuss the disparate impact on the following groups: 
(1) test takers in jurisdictions with extremely high MBE cut 
scores87 and with historically low bar passage rates; and 
(2) diversity candidates. 
1. Disparate Impact on Bar Test Takers in High MBE Cut 
Score States 
Kinsler’s analysis assumes that there is something termed 
“the bar exam.”  Kinsler neglects that passage rates on the many 
forms of the bar examinations are largely determined by each 
state’s chosen MBE cut score.  A simple comparison between the 
bar examination MBE cut scores and passage rates of Tennessee, 
the state he chose for his empirical study, and California, one of 
the most difficult bar examination passage cut scores, 
demonstrates how unwise and discriminatory his proposal is to 
limit bar examination test administrations based solely on 
pass/fail statistics. 
Kinsler states that the bar passage rate in Tennessee for 
first time takers from 2005 to 2014 was 87.76%.88  In comparison, 
the ABA first-time taker passage rate for California applicants 
during those years was only 73.75%.89  A 14.01% mean lower bar 
passage rate in California can be primarily explained by the 
differential in MBE cut scores between the two states.90  The 
 
86 Id. at 920. Kinsler suggests that a fourth attempt might be warranted based 
on the applicant’s earlier test results. Id. at 921. 
87 “The Multistate Bar Examination (MBE) is a six-hour, 200-question multiple-
choice examination developed by NCBE [National Conference of Bar Examiners] and 
administered by user jurisdictions as part of the bar examination.” Multistate Bar 
Examination, NAT’L CONF. OF B. EXAM’RS, http://www.ncbex.org/exams/mbe/. Each 
state determines its own bar examination MBE cut (passing) score. 
88 Id. at 894. 
89 STATE BAR OF CAL., supra note 10. Since California permits non-ABA 
accredited students to sit for the bar exam, this data only includes students who 
graduated from ABA accredited schools who took the California Bar Examination as 
a first time taker.  
90 The California bar has recently modified its bar passage statistical model and 
rates will now result in an approximately 0.5% increase because they will no longer 
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MBE cut score in Tennessee is only 135 but California’s cut score 
is 144.91  Why is Kinsler’s failure to include such disparate state 
bar passage standards and passage rates in his model so critical?  
The reason is that he uses bar passage as the sole criteria for 
predicting early career attorney disciplinary violations.  But, the 
problem is that one cannot draw the same conclusions about a 
bar applicant failing an easy, or lower MBE cut score, bar exam 
versus the failure of a student to pass a much more difficult bar 
examination, or higher MBE cut score exam. 
In a recent article, I demonstrated that even though students 
attending the bottom quartile of California ABA approved law 
schools have a very poor first time passage rate on the California 
Bar Examination because of the 144 MBE cut score, most of 
those students scored well enough on the MBE portion of the 
exam to have passed the bar examination in almost every other 
state.92  For instance, consider one example, Southwestern Law 
School.  The mean MBE cut score among the states is 134.93  
From February 2007 through July 2014, a similar period as 
studied by Kinsler in his Tennessee study, Southwestern 
students scored substantially higher than the national mean of 
133.94  In fact, Southwestern students scored between 138 and 
147.7 on the MBE even though their passage rates on the 
 
count students who do not complete the test or who score lower than forty on a 
question as test takers who failed the exam. Derek T. Muller, A Change in 
Calculating Pass Rates for the California Bar Exam, EXCESS DEMOCRACY (Dec. 5, 
2017), http://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2017/12/a-change-in-calculating-pass-rates-
for-the-california-bar-exam. 
91 See Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admission Requirements, NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM’RS & THE AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND 
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, (2018), at 33–34, http://www.ncbex.org/pubs/bar-
admissions-guide/2018/mobile/index.html#p=1. 
92 See generally William Wesley Patton, A Blueprint for a Fairer ABA Standard 
for Judging Law Graduates’ Competence: How a Standard Based on Students’ Scores 
in Relation to the National Mean MBE Score Properly Balances Consumer Safety 
with Increased Diversity in the Bar, 24 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 3 
(2017). Part of that article relied on Professor Anderson’s earlier study that 
demonstrated that California’s fourth-tier law schools’ mean MBE scores on the 
California Bar Examination would have resulted in those students passing the New 
York State Bar Examination at rates between fifty-seven and eighty-three percent. 
Robert Anderson, California Law School Bar Passage Rates Recalculated for the 
New York Bar, WITNESSETH: LAW, DEALS, & DATA (Dec. 19, 2016), 
http://witnesseth.typepad.com/blog/2016/12/california-law-school-bar-passage-rates-
recalculated-for-the-new-york-bar.html. 
93 Patton, supra note 92, at 12. 
94 Id. at 31–32. 
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California Bar Examination ranged during that examination 
period from a low of fifty-three percent to a high of seventy-four 
percent.95  What is equally surprising is that from 2007 through 
2014, the Southwestern students’ MBE scores would have passed 
all states’ bar exams in some years, and even during their worst 
bar year performance they would have passed all state bar exams 
except for Alaska, California, Delaware, Nevada, Oregon and 
Virginia, states with the highest MBE cut scores in the nation.96 
Kinsler’s multiple test taking, incompetency, and 
disciplinary violation model simply does not work.  He cannot 
possibly argue that students who fail the California Bar 
Examination, but who would pass almost all other bar exams 
based on their MBE scores, are incompetent without declaring 
that most other states are admitting incompetent attorneys who 
passed those states’ bar examinations on the first attempt, but 
with lower MBE scores than California’s 144 cut score.  Kinsler 
has not provided a shred of evidence to support his proposition 
that students who have to take the California bar exam multiple 
times and whose MBA scores would predict passage of almost 
every other state exam are more likely to commit disciplinary 
acts and endanger the public early in their careers.  Yet, he 
advocates for limiting these test takers to a maximum of three or 
four bar exam administrations to become a California attorney. 
2. The Kinsler Proposal’s Effect on Diversity in the Bar 
States with very high MBE cut scores and with large 
minority populations, like California, have a very low percentage 
of minority lawyers in relation to the minority state population.  
The United States Census states that the percentage of 
Hispanics in California increased from 32.4% in 2000 to 37.6% in 
2010,97 and comprised 38.9% of the California population in 
2016.98  According to the California State Bar Association, 
 
95 Id. at 31. 
96 Id. at 32. 
97 SHARON R. ENNIS ET AL., THE HISPANIC POPULATION: 2010, 6 (2011), 
https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-04.pdf (citing U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, Census 2000 Summary File 1; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 Census 
Summary File 1). 
98 Annual Estimates of the Resident Population by Sex, Race, and Hispanic 
Origin for the United States, States, and Counties: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2016, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU (June 2017), https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/ 
pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk. 
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Hispanics comprised 3% of California’s attorneys in 1991, 3.7% in 
2001, and 3.8% in 2006.99  In 2011, the most recent survey, 
Hispanics comprised only 4.2% of California attorneys.100  As of 
June 1, 2019,  there are currently 189,846 attorneys licensed to 
practice law in California.101  But, based on the 2011 survey 
results, only 7,837, or 4.2%, are Hispanic attorneys despite the 
fact that there are approximately 14,013,719 Hispanics living in 
California.102 
Adopting Kinsler’s recommendation of allowing a maximum 
of three bar examination attempts will exacerbate the already 
minimal diversity in the California bar because although some 
minority bar test takers have a low first-time passage rate, after 
several administrations, their passage rate substantially 
increases on the California exam.103  Several bar exam 
test-taking persistence studies indicate that many minority bar 
candidates benefit from having multiple attempts at passing the 
bar exam, especially those students who take bar exams in states 
with very high MBE cut scores.104  For instance, a study by Klein 
 
99 See Final Report of Results Member Services Survey February 2006, STATE 
BAR OF CAL. 12, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/reports/2006_State-
Bar-Survey.pdf? ver=2017-05-19-134112-167 (providing the demographic makeup of 
the California State Bar); see also Final Report California Bar Journal Survey 
September 10, 2001, STATE BAR  
OF CAL. 2, https://www.calbarjournal.com/Portals/1/documents/2001-CBJ-Survey-
Summary.pdf (indicating that the growth in California State Bar membership 
among Hispanics from 1991 to 2001 was smaller than the growth rate among 
Asians). 
100 See Summary Results Survey of Members of the State Bar of California 
December, 2011,  STATE BAR OF CAL. 8 http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/ 
documents/reports/2011-12_SBCdemosurvey_sumandfacts.pdf (indicating the 
percentage of California State Bar members amongst the 1,820 survey respondents 
that categorized their “ethnic or racial background” as “Latino/Hispanic”). But see id. 
at 10 (explaining that “the margin of sampling error would be approximately plus or 
minus three percent, with a confidence level of 95 percent,” and that “[t]he margin of 
sampling error for subgroups of respondents is higher than it is for the overall 
results”). 
101 See Licensee Demographics, STATE BAR OF CAL., https://members.calbar.ca. 
gov/search/demographics.aspx (providing the population of active attorneys that are 
licensed members of the California bar). 
102 See ENNIS ET AL., supra note 97, at 6 (listing the Hispanic or Latino 
population for California as found in the 2010 census). 
103 Patton, supra note 92, at 52–56. 
104 See generally Stephen P. Klein & Roger Bolus, Initial and Eventual Passing 
Rates of July 2004 First Timers of Texas Bar Exam, TEX. BD. OF LAW EXAM’RS 
(2006), https://ble.texas.gov/klein-report-0606 [hereinafter Klein & Bolus, Texas July 
2004]; Stephen P. Klein & Roger Bolus, A Comparison of Initial and Eventual 
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and Bolus compared minority test taker passage rates on the 
California bar examination according to the number of 
administrations of the exam they attempted.105  The study of 
minority persistence and ultimate bar-passage rates on the 
California Bar Examination compared the ultimate bar 
examination passage rates among cohort test takers that took 
the exam up to three times, up to five times, and up to seven 
times.106  The study found the following ultimate minority 
bar-passage rates based upon the number of times students 
repeated the examination: 
SUCCESS RATES PER MULTIPLE BAR EXAM ATTEMPTS107 
 All Hispanic All Black 
 1977 Exam
(Up to 7 
Exams)
1982 Exam
(Up to 3 
Exams)
1977 Exam
(Up to 7 
Exams)
1982 Exam 
(Up to 3 
Exams) 
Eventual 
Pass 
Percentage 
80% 54% 64% 38% 
 
Table 1 demonstrates the significantly higher ultimate 
bar-passage rates for Hispanic and black law students in 
California based on the number of opportunities to take the test.  
The Hispanic and black ultimate passage rates for both groups 
increased by twenty-six percent when up to seven repeat 
examinations were calculated rather than only including three 
bar administrations.108  The Klein and Bolus study demonstrates 
that under Kinsler’s maximum of three or four bar 
administrations, fewer minority test takers will become members 
of the California bar.109 
 
Passing Rates on the California Bar Examination, PR-87-5 (Oct. 30, 1987) 
[hereinafter Klein & Bolus, California 1987]. 
105 Klein & Bolus, California 1987, supra note 104, at ii. 
106 Id.  
107 Id.  
108 A second study by Klein and Bolus demonstrated that minority candidates in 
states with lower MBE cut scores and with higher annual bar passage rates than 
those in California need fewer examination attempts to pass the exam. See Klein & 
Bolus, Texas July 2004, supra note 104, at 6. 
109 The NCBE published a minority multiple test taker study that analyzed the 
July 2006 and 2007 California Bar Examinations. See Douglas Ripkey & Susan 
Case, Exploration of MBE Attempt Patterns: July 2006 and July 2007 First-Taker 
Groups, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM’RS, at 2, https://www.americanbar.org/ 
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The bottom line is that Kinsler’s study is significantly 
methodologically flawed and proposes a drastic remedy that is 
empirically unsupported and inconsistent with reasonably 
providing increased access to  justice. 
II. THE ANDERSON AND MULLER STUDY 
Analyzing Anderson and Muller’s study is important because 
there is a cross-pollination between their article and Kinsler’s.110  
The following section demonstrates some of the methodological 
and policy flaws in their article. 
Professors Anderson and Muller recently concluded that 
there is a connection between bar passage scores and the 
probability of state bar discipline, and that lowering the MBE cut 
score in California will result in an explosion of attorney 
 
content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/council
_reports_and_resolutions/March2016CouncilOpenSessionMaterials/2016_march__nc
be_persistance_data_recent.pdf. That study found that approximately 14.5% of black 
students took the July 2006 California Bar Examination four or more times and 
approximately 9% of Hispanic students took that exam four or more times. Id. For a 
detailed analysis of the many methodological flaws of the Ripkey and Case 
persistence study, see Memorandum from William Wesley Patton, Professor 
Emeritus, Whittier Law School, Assistant Clinical Vol Professor, UCLA David 
Geffen School of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry, to the American Bar 
Association Council (July 24, 2016) https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and
_resolutions/comments/201607_comment_s316_william_patton_8.pdf. That analysis 
demonstrates that the NCBE study is methodologically flawed because its use of 
MBE administrations is an inaccurate statistical prediction of the number of times 
students actually sit for the bar exam. Id. The NCBE study substantially 
underestimated the number of students who actually took the July 2006 and 2007 
bar exam. Id. For another study demonstrating the flaws of using the MBE as a 
proxy for the number of bar exam test takers, see Gary S. Rosin, Comments on Look-
Back Periods and Eventual Bar Passage Rates, 3 (July 31, 2012), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2121116. The NCBE has recently admitted that it only has 
ethnicity data for about sixty percent of MBE test takers and that it has “limited 
information on whether a given examinee is retaking the MBE.” Mark A. Albanese, 
The Testing Column February 2018: The MBE Storm Surge Continues, 87 B. 
EXAMINER, at 27–28. In addition, the NCBE admits that because the Uniform Bar 
Examination (UBE) permits candidates to transfer their MBE scores to other states, 
they do not actually know how many students repeat the MBE. Id. at 28. “In 2017 
alone, approximately 3,700 individuals transferred their UBE scores to another UBE 
jurisdiction—individuals who might otherwise have retaken the MBE.” Id. at 32. 
110 Kinsler relies on the Anderson and Muller study, and Anderson and Muller 
also rely on Kinsler’s study. See Kinsler, supra note 3, at 900 n.100; Anderson & 
Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 13 n.37). 
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disciplinary and legal malpractice cases.111  However, unlike 
Kinsler, Anderson and Muller discuss many of the problems and 
limitations inherent in their research.  Most importantly, they 
admit that they are uncertain regarding the importance of that 
relationship between the bar exam and attorney discipline.  They 
begin by proclaiming that there is a significant relationship,112 
but as the paper progresses, they admit that the relationship 
may not be significant and that the predictive power of bar 
examination performance which they term the “magnitude of the 
effect[,] may be larger or smaller than [they] estimate.”113 
Anderson and Muller’s study contains the following 
limitations and methodological weaknesses: 
1. Their “analysis is limited due to the imperfect data 
available . . .;”114 
2. They “do not have access to the bar exam scores of these 
attorneys.  Accordingly, [they] use proxies . . .;”115 
3. Their results require “numerous assumptions that [they] 
believe are reasonable but may not ultimately reflect the 
true relationships” among LSAT, bar scores, and attorney 
discipline;116 and  
4. “[A]lthough [their] model relies on aggregate (and noisy) 
data, it gives roughly accurate predictions of the 
individual data we do have.”117 
Unfortunately, Anderson and Muller fail to adequately 
address the most obvious questions: if lowering MBE cut scores 
substantially increases attorney discipline and endangers the 
public, why have the forty-eight states that have substantially 
lower MBE cut scores than California not experienced the 
explosion in disciplinary cases that they predict?  Also, why have 
states like Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington 
recently lowered their MBE cut scores if such a change threatens 
 
111 Since the publication of their piece, Anderson and Muller have each 
responded to criticism regarding the validity of their analysis, methodology, and 
conclusions. In this section, I discuss the significant criticism of their article and 
Professor Anderson’s confusing responses. 
112 See Anderson and Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 3). 
113 Id. (manuscript at 14). 
114 Id. (manuscript at 3). 
115 Id. (manuscript at 6). 
116 Id. (manuscript at 10) (emphasis added). 
117 Id. (manuscript at 12–13) (emphasis added). 
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their public safety?118  Finally, why have the media and the 
public in states with much lower MBE cut scores not zealously 
fought to increase the MBE cut score to protect the public from 
the onslaught of predicted attorney malpractice? 
A. States with a 133 MBE Cut Score Have Not Experienced the 
Attorney Disciplinary Increase Predicted by Anderson and 
Muller 
Anderson and Muller predict that if California lowered its 
MBE cut score from 144 to 133 there would be at least a 10% 
increase in the chances of an attorney with that MBE bar exam 
score of being disciplined during a thirty-five year career—a 
1,330 pass score would predict a 19% chance of discipline versus 
a 9% chance for a passing score of 1,440.119  If their data and 
predictions are accurate, the disciplinary rates in jurisdictions 
with a 1,330 pass score should be at least 10% higher than those 
in California.  Instead of testing their research and hypothesis in 
jurisdictions with a 133 MBE cut score—Connecticut, District of 
Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, New Jersey, New 
York, and South Carolina120—they took the easy way out by 
citing two law review articles that they say support their 
conclusion that “[c]ross-state comparisons may have little value 
due to disparities in state bar disciplinary procedures, 
enforcement, and priorities.”121  Their two referenced articles do 
not sufficiently support Anderson and Muller’s conclusion that 
conducting cross-state comparisons of attorney disciplinary 
 
118 Stephanie Francis Ward, California Sees Increase in Pass Rates for July 2017 
Despite Denying Requests to Lower Cut Score, ABA J. (Nov. 20, 2017), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/california_increase_bar_exam_pass_rate_jul
y; Sawsan Morrar, Should State Adopt Lower Passing Score for the Bar Exam? 
Current One May Harm Students of Color, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 7, 2019), 
https://www.sacbee.com/latest-news/article223879635.html. 
119  Anderson and Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 9). Under state bar 
grading, the MBE cut score 133, for instance, is scaled to a final score of 1330. 
120  Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admission Requirements 2017, NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM’RS & THE AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND 
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, (2017), at 30–31, https://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/ComprehensiveGuidetoBarAdmi
ssions/2017_comp_guide_web.authcheckdam.pdf. 
121 Anderson & Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 17 n.45) (citing Debra Moss 
Curtis, Attorney Discipline Nationwide: A Comparative Analysis of Process and 
Statistics, 35 J. LEGAL PROF. 209 (2011); H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., Federalism and 
Choice of Law in the Regulation of Legal Ethics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 73 (1997)). 
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statistics has “little value.”122  For instance, their reliance on 
Professor Curtis’s article is misplaced.  In her article, she merely 
noted that “finding this [bar exam disciplinary] information in 
one place to make comparisons among states and of lawyers 
licensed in multiple jurisdictions is difficult.”123  Curtis then 
spent more than one hundred pages providing comparative state 
attorney disciplinary statistics.124  Curtis would probably be 
surprised that Anderson and Muller, who rely on her data, find 
her study of “little value.” 
In addition, the other article cited by Anderson and Muller 
on the futility of comparing state disciplinary systems actually 
undercuts some of their rationale for failing to look at other 
states’ disciplinary patterns.  In that article, Professor Moulton 
states that “[t]he point is that we should be careful not to 
exaggerate the extent to which the substance of lawyer conduct 
standards varies among the states.  Most states’ rules are close to 
identical in substance if not in precise language.”125  Therefore, 
disciplinary statistics among states are not significantly skewed 
by the substance of ethical precepts.  Further, the thrust of the 
Moulton article is that lawyers who engage in multi-jurisdiction 
practices face uncertainty about how rules will be interpreted 
and enforced differently in multiple jurisdictions, not whether 
enforcement machinery has substantial disparities.126  Moulton 
even limits those potential multi-jurisdictional ethics conflicts 
and states that “where compliance with one state’s rule would 
mean violation of another state’s rule, and vice versa—is largely 
limited to the area of attorney-client confidentiality and exists 
only as a result of the rules in four states.”127  The Moulton 
article does not provide Anderson and Muller a safe harbor 
against the need to test their predictions of dramatically 
increased attorney disciplinary cases in other states with lower 
MBE cut scores.   
The reality is that the cross-state disciplinary articles that 
Anderson and Muller cite provide comparative attorney 
 
122 See Anderson & Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 17). 
123 See Curtis, supra note 121, at 209. 
124 See generally id. 
125 Moulton, supra note 121, at 95–96. 
126 Id. at 76–77. 
127 Id. at 100. “In terms of the states that have adopted the Model Rules, 
therefore, the level of disparity in adopted standards is not as great as advertised.” 
Id. at 91. 
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disciplinary statistics that are very germane to their prediction of 
escalating disciplinary cases if California were to change its MBE 
cut score to 133 or some other number lower than 144.  The 
following chart demonstrates that the percentage of attorneys 
with disciplinary charges and the mean ratio of disciplinary 
charges to actual disciplined attorneys in states with 133 MBE 
cut scores are not only similar to one another, but they are also 
not dramatically different than current California statistics.128  
Anderson and Muller’s prediction of a 10% increase in attorney 
disciplinary cases in California if the MBE cut score is changed 
to 133 is simply not supported by the comparative state attorney 
disciplinary evidence.129 
The following chart compares the percentage of attorneys 
charged with disciplinary violations and the rate of convictions to 
charges lodged in each state that uses a 133 MBE cut score with 
those rates in California that has a 144 cut score: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
128 I agree that comparing different jurisdictions’ disciplinary rates may not 
always be statistically accurate if those states have extremely different rates of 
enforcement and/or conviction rates. However, the states in this comparison of 133 
cut scores, other than Iowa, each have almost identical rates of prosecution and 
similar conviction rates. 
129 It is obvious that lowering the MBE cut score from 144 to 133 would result in 
more attorneys being admitted to the bar and that more disciplinary cases would be 
expected as the number of practicing attorneys increases. However, as discussed, 
infra Part II.B, it is a very different question of whether that increase in disciplinary 
cases is a function of bar examination performance or whether it is merely a result of 
bias and structural functions of the state bar disciplinary system itself. 
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STATE ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY STATISTICS FOR CALIFORNIA 
(MBE 144) & FOR STATES WITH 133 MBE CUT SCORES130 
State 
% of Attorneys 
Charged to Number 
of Active Attorneys
Mean % of Attorneys 
Charged to Those 
Actually Disciplined 
California131 Approx. 1% 10%
Connecticut132 Approx. 1% 15%
Illinois133 <1% 5%
Iowa134 Approx. 1% 25%
Kansas135 Approx. 1% 13%
Montana136 Approx. 1% 17%
New Jersey137 <1% 8%
New York138 <1% 8%
South Carolina139 1–3% 12%
 
This data demonstrates that the percentage of active 
attorneys with formal disciplinary complaints is similar across 
jurisdictions, even where MBE cut scores range from as low as 
133 to as high as 144, as in California.  In addition, unlike 
Anderson’s and Muller’s prediction that changing the cut score 
from 144 to 133 will result in at least a 10%, or possibly greater, 
increase in the California attorney disciplinary rate, the chart 
demonstrates that Iowa is the only state that has ever recorded a 
rate over 19%.  Further, in three states with a 133 MBE cut 
score, the percentage of disciplined attorneys is lower than in 
California—Illinois, New Jersey, and New York.  In three other 
states, the percentage is only slightly higher than in California—
Connecticut, Kansas, and South Carolina.  Not only does the data  
 
 
 
 
 
130 This data is derived from Curtis, supra note 121, at 209. 
131 Id. at 227–28. 
132 Id. at 232–33. 
133 Id. at 241, 245. 
134 Id. at 248–50. 
135 Id. at 250–52. 
136 Id. at 267, 270–71. 
137 Id. at 279, 282–83. 
138 Id. at 285, 288–89. 
139 Id. at 301–03. 
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not support their assertion, but the California Bar Association’s 
own study found no correlation between bar exam cut scores and 
attorney discipline.140 
 
B. Anderson and Muller Have Failed To Prove a Causal Link or 
Even a Critical Connection Between Bar Examination Scores 
and the Rate of Attorney Discipline 
Anderson and Muller state that they are “confident that the 
relationship between lower bar examination score and higher 
discipline is accurate.”141  They do not clarify whether that 
statement asserts that the relationship is merely a correlation or 
whether they assert a statistically significant causal link 
between low bar scores and attorney discipline.  After their paper 
was published and received significant criticism for their 
methodology and conclusions, they attempted to walk back what 
many readers thought was the authors’ claim of a causal link 
between bar scores and attorney discipline.142  For example, 
Professor Merritt concluded: “Despite some suggestive language 
in the paper, Anderson and Muller do not identify a direct 
correlation between bar exam scores and disciplinary actions.”143  
She stated that no causation was proven because there is a 
ten-year gap between the bar exam and attorney discipline 
manifesting and because they presented no proof of a connection 
between what the bar exam tests and the types of issues for 
which California attorneys are predominately disciplined.144 
The same day that Merritt’s critical review of their article 
was published, Anderson began backtracking.  Anderson 
attempted to make it clear that their paper does not allege 
causation between bar exam scores and attorney state bar 
discipline.  In his response, he provided two antithetical 
explanations for their paper’s findings: (1) “low bar exam scores 
are not actually causing discipline, but rather [are] merely 
 
140 Report to the Supreme Court of the State of California Final Report on the 
2017 California Bar Exam Standard Setting Study, STATE BAR OF CALI. 44–45 
(2017), http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/communications/CA-state-Bar-
Bar-Exam09122017.pdf. 
141 Anderson & Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 14). 
142 For an excellent analysis and criticism of the Anderson and Muller article, 
see Deborah J. Merritt, Bar Exam Score and Lawyer Discipline, L. SCH. CAFE (June 
3, 2017), https://www.lawschoolcafe.org/2017/06/03/bar-exam-scores-and-lawyer-
discipline/. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
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correlated with it;” and (2) their paper “argues that the current 
proposal to lower the required passing score for the California 
Bar Exam would result in an increased rate of discipline.”145  The 
problem, of course, is that when one argues that X action on Y 
will result in Z effect, you are stating causation: “Causation 
indicates that one event is the result of the occurrence of the 
other event; i.e. there is a causal relationship between the two 
events.  This is also referred to as cause and effect.”146 
At most, all that Anderson and Muller have demonstrated is 
that there is a greater chance that California attorneys who 
scored lower on the bar examination have a higher chance of 
being disciplined than those who scored higher.  That does not 
prove that attorneys with lower bar scores commit more ethical 
violations, but rather, only that California’s attorney disciplinary 
system happened to identify and sanction a greater percentage of 
lower scoring bar exam attorneys.  Anderson and Muller have not 
proven causation because the disparity in disciplinary filings 
may be caused by so many other variables that they did not build 
into a multi-variate analysis to determine relative causal weight, 
or as Professor Anderson recently phrased the issue, “the exact 
magnitude” of the relationship.147 
Their discussion of the differences between graduates of 
“elite” law schools and graduates of lower ranked schools in 
terms of the types of jobs they accept and the levels of predictive 
ethical violations within each of those types of legal employment 
is problematic.  The gist of their argument is as follows: 
1. Elite law school students score much higher on the bar 
exam;148 
2. Elite law school students hire into elite legal jobs;149 and 
3. California disciplinary records indicate a much lower 
percentage of disciplinary cases against those from elite 
law schools who work in elite law jobs.150 
 
145 Robert Anderson, Responsibility and Irresponsibility in the California Bar 
Exam Debate, WITNESSETH: LAW, DEALS, & DATA (June 2, 2017), https://witnesseth. 
typepad.com/blog/2017/06/responsibility-and-irresponsibility-in-the-california-bar-
exam-debate.html (emphasis added). 
146 Statistical Language – Correlation and Causation, AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF 
STATISTICS (last updated July 3, 2013), http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/ 
a3121120.nsf/home/statistical+language+-+correlation+and+causation.  
147 Anderson, supra note 145. 
148 See id. 
149 Anderson & Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 16–17). 
150 See id. 
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And their argument continues: 
4. Students from non-elite or much lower ranked law schools 
score lower on the bar exam;151 
5. Students from lower ranked law schools and who perform 
lower on the bar exam get jobs that are different, like 
jobs in  solo practice or small firms;152 and 
6. California disciplinary records indicate a much higher 
percentage of disciplinary cases involving attorneys from 
lower ranked schools who work in solo practice or small 
firms.153  
Anderson and Muller have justified their study as necessary to 
protect “the most vulnerable, least sophisticated clients;”154 
however, they fail to discuss one of the most vulnerable client 
populations: criminal defendants, who are often at the mercy of 
prosecutors who graduated from elite law schools.  Anderson and 
Muller do not discuss the ethical crisis among the highest scoring 
bar examination test takers from the most elite law schools who 
work in the United States Attorney Office or in elite state and 
county prosecution units.  According to one U.S. Attorney’s 
Office, not only is hiring into that office “highly competitive,” but 
those with “a judicial clerk[ship]” will be considered even if they 
do not have the expected years of lawyering experience.155  
Harvard Law School even informs its students that those who 
have a judicial clerkship have a serious leg up on the competition 
for becoming a U.S. Attorney.156  In addition, attorney jobs in 
county and city district attorney offices in large cities have 
become exceedingly competitive, with graduates from elite law 
schools now representing a large percentage of lawyers hired and 
graduates from fourth-tier law schools being rarely hired.157 
 
151 Anderson, supra note 145. 
152 Anderson & Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 16–17). 
153 Id. at 16–18. 
154 Anderson, supra note 145. 
155 Attorneys/Lawyers Employment, U.S. ATTY’S OFF. CENT. DISTRICT OF CALI., 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/employment/attorneyslawyers (last visited June 1, 
2019). 
156 Joan Ruttenberg et al., The Fast Track to a U.S. Attorney’s Office, BERNARD 
KOTEEN OFFICE OF PUB. INTEREST ADVISING, HARVARD LAW SCH., 8 (2014), 
https://hls.harvard.edu/content/uploads/2008/06/fast-track-final.pdf. 
157 It is extremely difficult to engage in a comprehensive study of district 
attorneys’ law schools because district attorney offices rarely publish a list of their 
attorneys. However, the Santa Clara, California District Attorney Office recently 
announced the hiring of fifteen new lawyers, which may be used as an example. See 
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Professor Muller has recently catalogued the relationship 
among elite law school students and judicial clerkships; they are 
essentially one and the same.  His study indicates that, from 
2014 to 2016, a super-majority of federal clerks attended only a 
handful of elite law schools including: Yale University, 200; 
Stanford University, 153; Harvard University, 312; University of 
Chicago, 98; University of Virginia, 159; Duke University, 82; 
University of California-Irvine, 40; University of California-
Berkeley, 110; and the University of Michigan, 119.158  In 
contrast, students from fourth-tier California Law Schools simply 
did not receive federal clerkships: Golden Gate University, zero; 
Whittier Law School, zero; Western State College of Law, zero; 
and Southwestern Law School, one.159 
Therefore, a review of ethical violations within the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office and other large city elite District Attorney 
Offices puts the Anderson and Muller findings to its strictest 
test.  Under their theory, we should find an ethically pristine 
legal environment in offices staffed by high bar exam scoring 
elite law students.  The data, however, tells a very different 
 
District Attorney Hires 15 New Lawyers, OFF. OF DIST. ATT’Y CTY. OF SANTA CLARA, 
https://www.sccgov.org/sites/da/newsroom/ 
newsreleases/Pages/NRA2012/District-Attorney-Hires-15-New-Lawyers.aspx (last 
visited June 1, 2019). I took that list of attorneys’ names and searched for the law 
school from which each graduated in a public attorney search offered by the 
California State Bar. See Licensee Search, STATE BAR OF CAL., 
http://members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/LicenseeSearch/QuickSearch (last visited June 1, 
2019) (enter the desired attorney’s name or licensee number in the search bar; then 
click search). One of the fifteen attorneys hired is deceased and those records are no 
longer maintained. Of the other fourteen attorneys hired, none attended any of the 
bottom quartile schools referenced by Anderson and Muller as likely to produce 
attorneys whose bar exam scores predict higher likelihood of bar discipline. And of 
those fourteen who were hired, one attended Harvard, one attended Stanford, two 
attended Berkeley, one attended UCLA, and one attended University of Virginia. It 
is generally recognized in the legal hiring arena that graduates of elite law schools 
have a distinct advantage in district attorney hiring decisions: “You must also excel 
while you are attending law school and it always looks better if you attend one of the 
more prestigious schools in the country.” Silas Reed, How to Become a District 
Attorney, LAW CROSSING, http://www.lawcrossing.com/article/5426/How-to-Become-
a-District-Attorney/ (last visited June 1, 2019). 
158 Derek T. Muller, Visualizing Law School Federal Clerkship Placements, 
2014-2016, EXCESS DEMOCRACY (May 15, 2017), http://excessofdemocracy.com/ 
blog/2017/5/visualizing-law-school-federal-judicial-clerkship-placement-2014-2016. 
159 Id. 
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story: some of these prosecutors commit serious ethical violations 
that place citizens in jeopardy of losing their liberty.160 
The Northern California Innocence Project published a study 
of hundreds of cases of demonstrated prosecutorial misconduct in 
California, including those that occurred in California federal 
courts where prosecutors were almost never sanctioned.161  The 
Innocence Project data demonstrates that Anderson and Muller 
are asking not only an incorrect question, but also an unfair one.  
The issue is not how many attorneys are actually disciplined, but 
how many and which attorneys are committing ethical violations 
even if the disciplinary system does not prosecute them.  The 
Innocence study found that judges rarely refer prosecutorial 
malpractice cases to the California Bar Association, and even if 
those cases are referred, the Bar Association rarely proceeds with 
disciplinary action: “Courts fail to report prosecutorial 
misconduct (despite having a statutory obligation to do so), 
prosecutors deny that it occurred, and the California State Bar 
almost never disciplines it.”162  Even though the State Bar 
Disciplinary overall conviction rate is 10%, only 1% of the 
prosecutorial misconduct claims the State Bar investigates result 
in convictions.163  “[T]he State Bar publicly disciplined only one 
percent of the prosecutors in the 600 cases in which the courts 
found prosecutorial misconduct and NCIP researchers identified 
the prosecutor.”164  Unlike the solo practitioners who Anderson 
and Muller accuse of committing the lion’s share of California’s 
 
160 See, e.g., Maura Dolan, U. S. Judges See ‘Epidemic’ of Prosecutorial 
Misconduct in State, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/ 
local/politics/la-me-lying-prosecutors-20150201-story.html (chronicling recent 
examples of serious prosecutorial misconduct in California courts that have been 
characterized as “epidemic”). 
161 KATHLEEN RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, N. CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
SANTA CLARA UNIV. SCH. OF L., PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997-2009 2–4 (2010), http://digitalcommons. 
law.scu.edu/ncippubs/2. 
162 Id. at 3.  
In California, as in many states, prosecutors rarely face sanctions for their 
courtroom tactics. For that reason, the Field case—which could result in 
the prosecutor being suspended or even barred from the practice of law—is 
seen by some as a test of the system’s ability to police itself. 
Leslie Griffy, Prosecutor Faces Rare Disciplinary Hearing Today, MERCURY NEWS 
(May 20, 2008, updated Aug. 14, 2016), http://www.mercurynews.com/ 
2008/05/20/prosecutor-faces-rare-disciplinary-hearing-today/. 
163 See Table, supra Part II.A. 
164 RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 161, at 3. 
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ethical violations, U.S. Attorneys and District Attorneys can use 
the political power of their offices to shield themselves from 
obloquy.165 
Perhaps the most famous denouncement of prosecutorial 
misconduct was by Judge Alex Kozinski, who said that violations 
“have reached epidemic proportions in recent years,” and that 
“[p]rofessional discipline is rare.”166  However, because, as Judge 
Kozinski states, “it’s highly unlikely [prosecutorial] wrongdoing 
will ever come to light,” we may never have the ability to 
compare the extent of ethical violations among attorneys from 
elite law schools in elite prosecution offices with graduates of 
lower ranked law schools in solo and small firm practice.167 
These attorneys who attended elite law schools, scored very 
well on the bar examination, and were hired into elite 
prosecution offices demonstrate the methodological flaws within 
Anderson’s and Muller’s conclusions.  Their study did not 
sufficiently account for system effects, such as political factors 
that affect the filing of state bar disciplinary actions or elite law 
firm “in-house” mechanisms for keeping ethical violations secret.  
In addition, elite law firm clients may prefer to address their 
problems privately rather than report misconduct to the state 
bar.  As the data on the lack of state bar sanctions against 
prosecutorial misconduct demonstrates, state bar disciplinary 
statistics do not predict the number of relative ethical violations 
among different groups of attorneys, but rather only predict the 
chances that those who violate ethics rules will be reported and 
prosecuted. 
All that Anderson and Muller have demonstrated is what the 
State Bar has known for more than a decade: (1) graduates of 
less elite law schools are more likely to work in solo or small 
firms where their ethical violations are more likely to be 
discovered, to be referred to the State Bar, and to require 
 
165 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Avila, 678 F.3d 955, 956 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(denying the U.S. Attorney’s Office motion to have the federal court delete the U.S. 
Attorney’s name from a case where prosecutorial misconduct played a significant 
role). 
166 United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 630–31 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). Although Olsen dealt with the failure of a U.S. Attorney to proffer 
alleged exculpatory information, Judge Kozinski also discussed other forms of 
prosecutorial misconduct, such as using unreliable experts and stated “some 
prosecutors turn a blind eye to such misconduct because they’re more interested in 
gaining a conviction than achieving a just result.” Id. at 632. 
167 Id. at 630. 
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discipline; and (2) graduates of elite law schools are more likely 
to work either in elite law firms or elite government positions 
where their ethical violations are less likely to be either 
discovered or reported, and those violations are less likely to 
result in disciplinary sanctions.168 
For instance, in 2001, the California State Bar issued a 
report studying complaints about disparate treatment of big law 
firm attorneys and solo practice and small firm attorneys in the 
disciplinary system.169  The study found that the State Bar 
Disciplinary system “is predominantly complaint driven,” and 
that practitioners of personal injury law, family law, criminal 
law, workers’ compensation, and building contract disputes are 
most often referred to the State Bar’s disciplinary system.170  But, 
perhaps most importantly, the State Bar study found that the 
culture in elite or large firms makes it much less likely that elite 
law firm lawyers who commit ethical violations will be referred to 
the State Bar disciplinary system: 
[S]olo and small firm attorneys can find themselves so 
overworked that they miss a statute of limitations, neglect to 
communicate a settlement offer or fail to return a client’s phone 
call.  In a large law firm, while these mistakes could result in a 
reprimand from the firm or even the loss of a job, it would not 
usually result in a complaint to the Bar.171 
Thus, a review of the differences between disciplinary actions 
against solo and small firm lawyers and elite law firm lawyers 
does not support Anderson and Muller’s conclusion that solo and 
small firm lawyers pose a greater risk to consumers because we 
lack data on the comparative number and seriousness of ethical 
violations by elite firm lawyers that are kept in-house and never 
reported.  Perhaps Anderson and Muller’s cynical observation 
 
168 See generally Anderson & Muller, supra note 4. 
169 STATE BAR OF CAL., INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF DISCIPLINARY 
COMPLAINTS AGAINST ATTORNEYS IN SOLO PRACTICE, SMALL SIZE LAW FIRMS AND 
LARGE SIZE LAW FIRMS 14 (2001), http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/ 
reports/2001_SB143-Report.pdf? ver=2017-05-19-134106-347. The State Bar did not 
find a bias against solo practice and small firm practitioners, but rather that more 
complaints were filed against those attorneys than against large firm attorneys. Id. 
170 Id. at 14, 17. The State Bar report included several other variables that 
justified the greater percentage of solo practice and small firm attorney cases 
litigated in the State Bar disciplinary system that have nothing to do with the actual 
ethical violation being investigated: (1) solo practice and small firm attorneys often 
cannot afford to hire an attorney to defend them in the State Bar Proceeding; (2) solo 
practice and small firm attorneys’ records are often less cooperative. Id. at 1–2, 13. 
171 Id. at 18 (emphasis added). 
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about students from elite law schools is correct: “It may be the 
case that graduates of more elite law schools are more 
sophisticated in covering up their unethical behavior. . . .”172  
Anderson and Muller have not proven that attorneys that 
graduate from lower ranked schools, score lower on the bar, and 
work in solo practice and small firms are (1) more unethical; (2) a 
greater danger to consumers; or (3) incompetent to practice law. 
In addition, as discussed in Part 1, the Connecticut attorney 
disciplinary study determined that there is no correlation 
between law school grades and disciplinary patterns, and that 
the correlation between attending a low ranked law school and 
disciplinary cases is only 0.3%.173 
C. The Methodological Flaws and Weakness of the Study 
Anderson and Muller admit that a well-designed and highly 
predictive study of the relationship between bar passage and 
attorney discipline would consist of the following data on each 
disciplined attorney, including: 
1. Law school attended; 
2. Date of Admission; 
3. LSAT score; 
4. Law school GPA; 
5. Public disciplinary record; 
6. Bar exam score, including MBE score.174  
However, the authors did not use individualized LSAT scores, 
law school GPAs, or bar exam scores.  Instead, they use what 
they term “proxies” for this data.  The chain of proxies, difficult 
to follow, is linked in the following manner: 
1. A disciplined attorney’s LSAT score was estimated based 
on the 25th and 75th percentile LSAT scores at the 
attorney’s law school.175  However, this calculation 
amounts to no more than a guess of where that student 
fits on the full range of LSAT scores within the law school.  
The probability of the accuracy of that prediction is very 
low and such an erroneous estimate could significantly 
affect any conclusions regarding that particular 
disciplined attorney’s bar passage score. 
 
172 Anderson & Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 17). 
173 Levin et al., supra note 7, at 32. 
174 Anderson & Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 3–7). 
175 Id. (manuscript at 6–7). 
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2. They then predicted the law school’s average bar passage 
score by using the LSAT average by “interpolating” that 
score from data published by the National Conference of 
Bar Examiners [“NCBE”].176  One problem is that 
Anderson and Muller do not describe their interpolation 
protocol.  The NCBE does not publish individual law 
school students’ or law schools’ LSAT scores or MBE 
scores, and therefore, it is difficult to understand how this 
interpolation has any statistical validity regarding the 
analysis of any single disciplined attorney referred to the 
State Bar. 
3. They then tested their model against a single set of data 
for the July 2016 California that examined the mean MBE 
scores of individual law schools—but not the scores of 
individual test takers.177  The obvious problem is that the 
Anderson and Muller study analyzed bar exam data for 
graduates from 1975 to 2006, but their test instrument 
was based on a single administration of the California bar 
examination.  They did not address the possibility that 
the school specific bar passage scores and mean MBE 
scores were aberrant for that July 2016 administration of 
the California bar examination.  Based upon my 
inspection of California State Bar Examination records for 
tests from February 2007 to July 2015 for Whittier Law 
School, the first-time test taker MBE mean scores varied 
from a low of 133.6 to a high of 146.4.178  This significant 
variation among different bar examination 
administrations demonstrates the methodological flaw in 
the Anderson and Muller study.  A single law school’s 
mean MBE score cannot accurately predict an individual 
attorney’s disciplinary history. 
 
176 Id. (manuscript at 7). 
177 Id. I commiserate with their inability to gather sufficient data from the State 
Bar to conduct a more statistically reliable study, and I join their request that more 
State Bar data should be released to the public. 
178 Patton, supra note 92, at 33. 
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D. A Study of Wisconsin Attorney Disciplinary Cases 
Demonstrates That No Correlation Exists Between Passing a 
Bar Exam or Admission by Diploma Privilege, and 
Disciplinary Violation Rates 
A study, submitted to the ABA Council by the author, 
demonstrates that there is no correlation between attorney 
discipline and bar admission method, whether through passing a 
bar exam or through being admitted pursuant to “diploma 
privilege.”179  In that study, the author examined Wisconsin 
disciplined attorneys from January 2013 to March 2016 in 
relation to whether they had to pass a bar exam or whether they 
were admitted by diploma privilege.180  By employing a chi-
square analysis, the data demonstrated that there was no valid 
statistical relationship between rates and/or the seriousness of 
attorney disciplinary violations and attorneys’ method of bar 
admission.181  The results actually disproved my hypothesis that 
diploma privilege admitted attorneys would have a greater 
number and more serious ethical violations than those who 
passed a bar exam.  In a companion study of bar passers versus 
diploma admitted attorneys, the author conducted an additional 
analysis of the patterns and seriousness of those two groups’ 
disciplinary violations.182  The results demonstrated that the bar 
passage  group had more sustained disciplinary cases and that 
those disciplinary violations were usually based upon more 
serious ethical violations than the diploma admitted attorneys.183  
For instance, the diploma admitted group’s recidivist rate was 
0.99, but the bar exam group’s rate was 1.52.184  The diploma 
 
179 Memorandum from William Wesley Patton, Professor Emeritus, Whittier 
Law School, Assistant Clinical Vol Professor, UCLA David Geffen School of 
Medicine, Department of Psychiatry, to ABA Council (Apr. 22, 2016). 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_
admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/comments/201607_comment
_s316_william_patton_2.pdf. The author submitted additional bar exam studies to 
the ABA, which can be found at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_ 
education/resources/notice_and_comment/notice_comment_archive/.  
180 Id. at 4–5. 
181 Id. at 6–7. 
182 Memorandum from William Wesley Patton to ABA Council on Legal 
Education & Admission to the Bar 1 (May 7, 2016). 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 3. The “recidivist rate” refers to those attorneys who committed one or 
more additional disciplinary violation after having been formally disciplined for a 
previous ethical violation. 
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group’s violations involving dishonesty was 33%, but it was 43% 
for the bar exam group.185  The percentage of cases involving 
monetary violations was similar for both groups: 40% for diploma 
admitted and 46% for bar exam admitted.186 
These two studies of the differences between Wisconsin 
attorneys admitted by bar exam versus those admitted by the 
diploma privilege raise serious questions about the Anderson and 
Muller conclusions.  The Wisconsin studies suggest the 
possibility that the bar exam could be either irrelevant or only 
marginally relevant in predicting attorney misconduct.  Much 
more research is needed before we determine whether there is 
any correlation between bar examination performance and 
predicted disciplinary violations. 
E. Anderson and Muller’s Claim That Lowering the California 
MBE Cut Score Will Increase Malpractice Cases Is 
Inconsistent with State Bar Disciplinary Statistics 
Anderson and Muller predicted that those with low 
California bar passage scores would have a greater chance of 
being disciplined than attorneys with high passage scores.187  
They assumed, without analysis, that those disciplined attorneys 
would “increase the amount of malpractice, misconduct, and 
discipline among [California attorneys]” and that would reduce 
consumer protection.188 
First, Anderson and Muller presented no data to 
demonstrate that changing the California MBE cut score would 
increase malpractice rates.  They did not present any 
quantitative or qualitative data and analysis to prove that the 
types of misconduct that result in attorney discipline in 
California also would support the very different legal standard in 
malpractice cases.  Many acts sanctioned by the State Bar do not 
amount to malpractice.  A study that the author sent to the ABA 
Section on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar analyzed 
163 California State Bar disciplinary opinions issued from 
January 1 to April 30, 2016.189  That analysis demonstrated that 
 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Anderson & Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 2–3). 
188 Id. (manuscript at 2) (emphasis added). 
189 Memorandum from Patton, supra note 182, at 1.  
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51% of the 163 charges involved client trust fund violations.190  
Many of those violations only involved inappropriate comingling 
of funds.191  Almost none of those cases would support legal 
malpractice filings because most of the violations either did not 
result in harm to the client versus potential harm to the client, or 
they did not result in any prejudice to the client’s legal cause of 
action.  Another 18% of the cases involved drug and/or alcohol 
problems or failures to meet disciplinary probation conditions, 
issues unrelated to any specific lawyer acts that would give rise 
to a malpractice action.192  Cases associated with the common 
claims for malpractice such as not meeting a statute of 
limitations, failure to call a critical witness, failure to reasonably 
engage in discovery, failure to inform a client of a proffered 
settlement offer, etc., were almost non-existent.  Therefore, 
Anderson and Muller’s prediction that lowering the California 
MBE score would result in a substantial increase in malpractice 
claims is simply unproven and empirically unsupported. 
Anderson and Muller admitted that lowering the MBE cut 
score may “increase access to justice and likely lower costs for 
consumers.”193  However, they did not decide whether such 
benefits are outweighed by their prediction of increased bar 
discipline.  They provided no evidence that indigent clients would 
be better off proceeding pro se rather than being represented by 
an attorney who graduated from an accredited law school and 
who passed a bar exam but who is predicted to commit an 
unspecified ethical violation sometime during that attorney’s 
career.194  They have presented insufficient evidence that 
California attorneys who score lower than 144 on the bar exam 
and who would be admitted to practice law in almost every other 
state pose a serious risk to the California public. 
 
CONCLUSION 
I applaud Professors Kinsler, Anderson, and Muller for 
investigating whether the bar examination is relevant to 
patterns of attorney discipline.  However, their research failed to 
 
190 Id. at 6. 
191 See id.  
192 Id. 
193 Anderson & Muller, supra note 4 (manuscript at 19). 
194 In one study, “[Sixty-two percent] of the judges said that outcomes were 
worse for the unrepresented parties.” Judge Denise S. Owens, The Reality of Pro Se 
Representation, 82 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 147, 148–49 (2013). 
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prove that: (1) students from low rated law schools engage in 
significantly more unethical behavior; (2) there is a causal 
relationship or correlation between students who attend low 
ranked schools, their bar exam scores, and their disciplinary 
patterns; or (3) students from low ranked schools who scored 
lower on the bar exam are either not minimally competent to 
practice law or are a significantly greater danger to the public 
than students who attended elite law schools.  They also failed to 
prove that lowering an extremely high MBE cut score to one near 
the national MBE mean will have any significant effect on 
attorney misconduct.  Finally, they failed to demonstrate any 
connection between the number of times attorneys retake the bar 
exam, attorney disciplinary rates, and danger to the public. 
Serious social harm can result from reliance on statistically 
and methodologically flawed bar examination studies.  For 
instance, from my perspective, Anderson and Muller’s zealous 
arguments against lowering the California MBE cut scores could 
needlessly lead to: (1) a loss of many attorney candidates, 
including diversity candidates, who could provide legal services 
to California residents; (2) an unreasonable monopoly on the 
practice of law that has long-term impact on the availability and 
cost of legal services; and (3) great economic and psychological 
harm to the hundreds of attorney applicants whose MBE scores 
demonstrate that they would have been admitted to  most other 
state  bar associations in the United States,195 but who, because 
of the 144 MBE cut score, failed the California bar examination.  
In addition, Kinsler’s proposed national maximum number of bar 
examination attempts will substantially limit access to the bar by 
qualified candidates whose circumstances, such as single 
parenthood, poverty, or health, create significant challenges to 
studying for the bar.  Ultimately, the studies by Professor  
 
 
195 Id. at 148–49. Anderson’s earlier study demonstrated that California’s 
fourth-tier law schools’ mean MBE scores on the California Bar Examination would 
have resulted in those students passing the New York bar examination at rates 
between fifty-seven percent and eighty-three percent. Anderson, supra note 145. In 
addition, Professor Muller has demonstrated that even though many California bar 
exam test takers fail the California bar exam, students from California law schools 
perform better on the MBE than students in other states. Derek T. Muller, 
California Bar Exam Takers Are Far More Able than Others Nationwide but Fail at 
Much Higher Rates, EXCESS DEMOCRACY (Nov. 21, 2015), 
http://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2015/11/california-bar-exam-takers-are-far-more-
able-than-others-nationwide-but-fail-at-much-higher-rates. 
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Kinsler, and Professors Anderson and Muller, while  
commendable in their aims, represent little more than 
methodologically flawed attempts to rationalize harmful and 
elitist intuitions about the legal profession. 
